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EVIDENCE
In re Grand Jury Proceedings v. United States, 857 F.2d 710
Company X appeals an order to compel the production of docu-
ments for grand jury use. The district court determined that the scope
of the subpoenas and the primafacie evidence of attorney involvement in
the alleged crime and fraud fell within the exception to the attorney-
client privilege and did not need to be individually examined. The
Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's findings since the purpose of
the communication between Company X and Law Firm Y was to further
a crime or an intended fraud.
United States v. Law Firm Z, 857 F.2d 707
The United States appeals that portion of the district court's order
denying its motion to compel production of nonprivileged documents
for use in its grand jury investigation.
The Tenth Circuit found the district court's failure to compel pro-
duction of nonprivileged documents, because that court deemed the
documents redundant, was insufficient to permit meaningful review.
The portion of the district court's order relating to its failure to so com-
pel was therefore vacated and remanded.
United States v. Ashby, 864 F.2d 690
Appellant appeals from a conviction of possession and aiding and
abetting the possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Her pre-
trial motion to suppress certain evidence was denied and she was con-
victed. At the appellate level she made various claims of error, none of
which warranted reversal.
The court stated that documents used by the prosecution were not
hearsay and were relevant for the purpose for which they were intro-
duced. The jury instructions were supported by sufficient evidence at
trial and did not constitute an abuse of discretion, and evidence was suf-
ficient to prove intent to distribute the marijuana. The conviction was
affirmed.
Alexander v. United States, 849 F.2d 1293
Defendant Alexander appeals his conviction for mail and wire fraud
under 18 U.S.C. § § 1341 and 1343 on the grounds of prosecutorial
misconduct and improper exclusion of evidence. The Court of Appeals
held that (1) prosecutorial misconduct is prejudicial only when it influ-
ences the verdict (which the record here failed to show), and (2) eviden-
tiary rulings are only reversible for abuse of discretion. Here, in view of
the many conflicting reasons for settlements, evidence of prior settle-
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ment of civil damages arising out of the same incident were properly
excluded. Affirmed.
Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 865 F.2d 1150
Appellant Meuli appeals an unfavorable jury verdict on the grounds
the district court improperly excluded evidence of prior lawsuits against
a manufacturer of grain silos, and did not offer reasons for dismissing
other parties to the lawsuit. Affirmed.
The court of appeals held that the district court properly excluded
Meuli's offer of proof, since it related to lawsuits against the manufac-
turer in California which took place in the 1960's. Noting that the law-
suits involved a different product and a large gap in time, the court
agreed that evidence concerning them would likely serve only to confuse
a jury. The court also held that since Meuli never objected to the dis-
missal of the other parties, they waived their right to raise this issue on
appeal.
United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512
Appellant United States appeals the district court's granting of a
motion to suppress evidence discovered in the course of a traffic stop.
Affirmed.
A New Mexico State Police Officer pulled over Guzman, who was
driving a rented 1987 Cadillac with Florida plates, for not wearing his
seatbelt. Guzman's driver license and registration were in order, but the
officer persisted in his questioning of Guzman, and finally obtained a
consent to search from him. Upon searching the car, $40,000 in cash
and five kilograms of cocaine were seized.
The court of appeals held that the proper test for determining
whether a traffic stop is valid is whether a reasonable officer in the same
circumstances would have made the stop. In this instance, the court
held that the stop was merely a pretextual one, and that insufficient
probable cause existed to justify the actions taken by the police officer.
United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173
Appellant Cuch appeals his conviction of sexual assault and illegal
possession of a firearm. Affirmed.
Appellant appeals on the grounds the district court improperly ad-
mitted evidence of a prior sexual assault. The court of appeals held that
this evidence was properly admitted under FRE 404(b), because evi-
dence had real probative value, was established with clear and convinc-
ing evidence, was not about acts unduly remote in time, and all the




Willner v. University of Kansas, 848 F.2d 1020
On appeal from ajudgment for defendant-appellee in a sex discrim-
ination action. Affirmed.
The panel found that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the recusal motions because the motions failed to allege suffi-
cient facts, involved adverse rulings, or were untimely. Upon review of
the record, the panel upheld the district court's findings that the appel-
lant wilfully disregarded the court's orders to cooperate in the discovery
process. Thus, dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the individual de-
fendants prior to trial was not error. Finally, the panel concluded that
the thoroughness of the court's findings and extensive discussion of the
evidence shows that the court carefully considered the entire record.
The district court's findings were not clearly erroneous.
Big Horn Coal Company v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259
This breach of contract case involved an Illinois public utility
(Edison), and two Wyoming coal producers. Edison notified coal com-
panies that it was exercising section 3.01, a force majeure clause, to re-
duce its scheduled minimum purchase obligations (amounting to 1.5
million tons of coal per year for a ten-year period) in order to comply
with an Illinois EPA order. The coal companies brought this suit.
Edison appeals a jury verdict totalling more than $500 million rendered
against it in the district court.
This appeal explores the good faith doctrine of contract law in some
depth, although "good faith" is never defined. The judgment is upheld
as the Tenth Circuit found no error in the instructions given by the dis-
trict court.
United States v. Markopoulos, 848 F.2d 1036
Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana. On
appeal, Markopoulos challenged the admissibility of several items of evi-
dence, and claims the trail court erred in failing to limit certain jury in-
structions to his co-defendant. He also contends the evidence at trial
was insufficient to support his conviction. The Tenth Circuit held that
none of the issues constituted reversible error and the evidence sup-
ported the conviction.
The court affirmed the district court holding that a co-defendant's
statements are admissible under the sixth amendment if the court ex-
cludes all references to defendant and instructs the jury that the state-
ment is not admissible against defendant. Admission of codefendant's
statements were only "inferentially incriminating."
The court found that the jury instructions had been erroneous with
respect to defendant, but did not believe they required reversal. De-
fendant was convicted only on the conspiracy charge and this conviction
could not have been based on the evidence of the codefendant's prior
acts.
1989]
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United States v. Pinto, 838 F.2d 426
Appeal from conviction for conspiring to defraud the United States
and falsifying tax returns. Affirmed.
Pinto and her husband concealed $150,000 in income from selling
marijuana. They used cash to purchase three residences and then ob-
tained false mortgages to make it appear that the purchase money had
come from loans. The court rejected defendant's claim that the evi-
dence was insufficient to support a conviction. From witness' testimony
and inferences drawn therefrom, the evidence was sufficient to support
the jury's finding of Pinto's intent to conspire. The lower court admit-
ted co-conspirator hearsay before finding the existence of a conspiracy,
but, if admitted as such, it was conditionally admissible subject to being
connected to the conspiracy and, therefore, it was not improper to admit
it. This hearsay was also admissable because it was an admission by the
co-conspirator.
Pinto also claimed that the evidence adduced at trial varied too
greatly from the actual charges in that it indicated the existence of an
uncharged conspiracy to possess, sell, and distribute drugs. Even
though Pinto was not charged with this crime, the court found that the
defendant could have anticipated this evidence at trial based on the ac-
tual charges, and therefore, her claim was meritless. The lower court's
denial of Pinto's motion to sever the trial was proper based on judicial
economy, avoidance of duplicitious trials, the court's continuous admo-
nitions, and the general rule to jointly try individuals jointly indicted.
Finally, charges were filed within the six-year statute of limitations be-
cause the object of the conspiracy did not end with the filing of the tax
return.
United States v. Temple, 862 F.2d 821
Temple appeals the district court's decision to admit evidence of-
fered under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) concerning prior acts of the defendant.
Reversed and remanded.
Defendant was convicted of conspiracy and aiding and abetting the
smuggling of illegal aliens from Mexico into the United States. Prior to
trial, the defendant moved to exclude government evidence of three
prior acts which were of the same nature as the charge at bar. The dis-
trict court denied the defendant's motion in limine and admitted the
evidence. When reviewing evidentiary rulings of the trial court, this
court may only reverse upon a finding of abuse of discretion. This court
found the first prior act properly admissable under Rule 404(b) in order
to show the defendant's common plan, preparation, and intent to trans-
port aliens. The other two prior acts were deemed inadmissable, how-
ever, since Rule 404(b) excludes evidence of a person's character "for
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith." The govern-
ment failed to show that these two prior acts fell within an exception
770 [Vol. 66:4
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under Rule 404(b). The probative value of this evidence was substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

